







In  this  paper,  I  seek  to  analyse  how  cross‐border  spaces  are  constructed 
through  the  activities  and  strategies  of  established  and  emerging  cross‐
border networks. In order to observe cross‐border actors and public policies, 
I  use  three  case  studies,  two  in  the  European  Union,  i.e.  the  Rhineland 
Valley,  also  known  as  Upper  Rhine  (France‐Germany‐Switzerland)  and  the 
Mediterranean  Euroregion  (France‐Spain),  and  one  in  North  America,  i.e. 
Cascadia  (Canada‐United  States).  I  propose  to  draw  our  theoretical 
approach  from a model  suggested  by  P.  Bourdieu,  so  that  it  is  possible  to 






processes,  either  by  public  and  private  players  or  by  scholars.3  This  metaphor  as 
“laboratories”  of  Europe  conveys  political  and  performative  goals  for  several  levels  of 
governance,  including  cross‐border and multilevel networks,  for  instance  in  the Rhineland 
Valley:  in  this  European  borderland  at  the  periphery  of  three  Nation‐States  (France‐





outside  Europe  as  explicit  examples  or  models.  In  this  respect,  recent  academic  works 







In  such  comparative exercises, many  facets of  cross‐border phenomena are better  known 
(e.g.  institutionalization  processes,  multilevel  governance  practices,  evolutions  of  cross‐
border  and  cross‐cultural  representations,  regional  and  local  reception  of  supra‐national 
and  international  policies,  and  so  forth).4  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  gap  in  the  way  cross‐
border networks are socio‐politically constructed in these cross‐border regions.5 Therefore, 
it is difficult to understand current specific dynamics that propel or slow down cross‐border 
initiatives.  Actually,  one  of  the main  issues  in  Europe  and  North  America  is  the  complex 
deepening  of  border  regions.  This  research  related  to  the  socio‐political  space  of  cross‐




observe  cross‐border  actors  and  public  policies,  I  use  three  case  studies,  two  in  the 
European  Union  (EU),  i.e.  the  Rhineland  Valley,  also  known  as  Upper  Rhine  (France‐
Germany‐Switzerland) and the Mediterranean Euroregion (France‐Spain), and one in North 
America, i.e. Cascadia (Canada‐United States). Those three territories have a rich history as 
cross‐border  spaces,  as  they  emerge  since  the  1960’s  as  functional  territories  that  are 
superimposed  to  existing  levels  of  governance.  They  incrementally  create  new  solidarity 
networks  across  the  border  (Bach  and  Leresche,  1995).  In  comparing  the  factors  that 
structure  both  spaces,  my  ultimate  goal  is  to  draw  the  socio‐political  space  of  these 
networks in each region, to compare them and to suggest new research lenses for Cascadia. 
In  order  to  draw  the  socio‐political  maps  of  Cascadia,  Upper  Rhine  and  Mediterranean 
Euroregion6,  I  use  a  model  created  by  Pierre  Bourdieu  (1979)  that  will  allow  analyzing 
relative social positions of cross‐border networks. I proceed with three key questions: first, 
how distinct  territorial  issues are  represented, created and  institutionalized  in Europe and 
North  America?  Second,  to what  extent  do  private‐public mix  and  political  conflict  shape 
cross‐border  relations within  and  outside  these  networks?  Is  it  possible  to  formulate  the 




If we want  to  visualize  the  three  aspects  of  this  paper  (i.e.  socio‐political  construction  of 
territorial  problems,  private  and  public  partnerships  /  divisions,  and  cross‐border  “low 
gravity” principle), it might be useful to sketch a figure in three dimensions, in order to map 
the relative social positions of the different cross‐border actors and networks, inspired by a 
socio‐political  map  drawn  by  Pierre  Bourdieu  (1979).  In  the  volume  titled  Distinction, 




a  high  amount  of  economic  capital  but  less  cultural  capital  (e.g.  captains  of  industry)  are 






with  increasing  or  decreasing  social  positions.  Additionally,  although  Bourdieu  considers 
that economic and cultural  capitals are  two  fundamental  types of  structuring  resources  in 
contemporary Western countries, he considers  that other resources may be  integrated,  in 
order to reflect specific socio‐political hierarchies. 

















more  numerous,  diverse,  and  located  on  a  quite  near  area  in  Cascadia,  e.g.  Cascadia, 
Pyrenean  and  Rhineland  networks  are  on  the  upper  part  of  the  figure,  and  rather  well‐
balanced  in  terms  of  economic  and  cultural  capitals;  (ii)  the  sum of  both  capitals may  be 
correlated with the territorial issues and subsequent definitions of the cross‐border region, 
e.g.  Pacific  NorthWest  Economic  Region  (PNWER)  and  the  Discovery  Institute  suggest  a 
larger definition of Cascadia than the definition suggested by environmentalist activists; (iii) 
cross‐border  policy  networks  in  the  Upper  Rhine  exclude  some  social  movements,  e.g. 
association of  cross‐border workers, environmental  coalitions,  that need  therefore  to  find 
other  interlocutors  at  the  national  or  European  levels:  as  the  cross‐border  level  is  a  poor 
level  of  policy  making  and  decision  making,  the  level  of  reference  for  those  groups  are 
increasingly  defined  by  the  supranational  level;  conversely,  in  Cascadia,  the  lack  of  cross‐
border  and  supranational  levels  of  governance  explains why  some demands  exist  but  are 
hardly addressed: (iv) the various cross‐border policy networks are not only constructed, at 



















Defining  Cascadia(s)  as  a  borderland:  institutionalizing  multiple 
territorial issues 
Looking  at  the  institutionalization  of  several  specific  issues  at  the  cross‐border  level  is 
useful, since cross‐border networks seek to define a cross‐border region according to their 
own  interests.  Hence,  it  is  possible  to  observe  that  actors,  organizations  and  networks  in 




territorial  strategies.  However,  this  North‐American  example  is  not  isolated,  as  European 
case studies tend to show it. 
Patrick  J.  Smith  is  right  to  emphasize  that  Cascadia,  besides  alternative  notions  –  e.g. 







and Rocky Mountain  ranges.  (iii) A  third definition of Cascadia  refers  to an  institutional or 
“traditional  Cascadia”  (Smith,  ibidem),  including  the  states  of  Washington,  Oregon  and 
province of British Columbia. (iv) Finally, an extensive conception of the Pacific North‐West 





several  organizations  try  to  prioritize  certain  socio‐political  issues  (e.g.  environment,  free 




society’s  non‐profit  initiatives  including  “People  for  Puget  Sound”), whereas  “Main  Street 
Cascadia”  is  adopted  by  the  Seattle‐based  public  policy  think‐tank  “Discovery  Institute”, 
created  in  1990. With  the  addition  of Alaska,  the  institutional  Cascadia  knows  a  variation 
that  is  relevant  to  the  “Pacific  Corridor  Enterprise  Council”  (PACE),  which was  created  in 
1989,  “as  a  non‐profit,  business  organization  to  promote  cross‐border  transactions  and 
advocate  the  removal  of  barriers  that  impede  the  legitimate  flow  of  people,  goods  and 
services across  the Canada/USA border”.7 PACE gathers more than 200 small and medium 
size  business  entities.  Finally,  the  largest  definition  of  Cascadia  applies  to  the  PNWER,  a 
partnership  of  private  sector  and  political  representatives,  issued  from  the  “Pacific 
NorthWest  Legislative  Forum”,  in  1989.  In  1991,  PNWER  was  formally  established  “by 
uniform  legislation  passed  in  each  of  the member  jurisdictions”.8  Therefore,  suggesting  a 
number  of  definitions  of  Cascadia  through  at  least  four  competing  spatial  approaches 
reveals the attempt from partners or competitors to impose to the political field – and also 
other  social  fields  like  the media  –  their  dominant  and  legitimate  definition  of  the  cross‐
border region. Changeover of political power between parties influences this agenda as well 
(for instance, BC Premier Michael F. Harcourt from 1991 to 1996 supported the sustainable 
development  of  Vancouver,  and  signed  in  May  1992  the  Environmental  Cooperation 




least  in  four  different  ways:  (i)  it  has  been  interpreted  as  a  “lack  of  coordination  and 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leadership”  that  disclose  conflicting  strategies  between  regional  players  –  some  of  them 
supporting  a  strict  BC‐Washington  space,  other  in  favor  of  a  larger  cross‐border  territory 
that may carry some weight within the US domestic political arena (Artibise, 2005: 257‐258); 
(ii)  institutions  are  “not  strong  enough”  to  arbitrate  disputes  and  have  a  redistributive 
function, but are  rather described as a pattern of  ‘multi‐polity governance’ where nation‐
states are  complemented by  cross‐border networks  (Blatter, 2001: 201‐201);  (iii) Cascadia 
experiences a “growing institutionalization (…) fostered by a melding of earlier definitional 
alternatives”,  with  a  more  active  role  from  state/provincial  levels  of  governance  (Smith, 
2002:  140);  (iv)  Susan  Clarke  seeks  to  analyze  these  conflicting  interests  that  are 
geographically  visible  in  identifying  three  competing  networks  of  Cascadia  (2001;  2002): 
first,  bioregionalist  activists  include  the  “broader  sustainable  development  community” 
(Clarke, 2002: 8), e.g. Georgia Basin Action Plan, People for Puget Sound, Save the Georgia 
Strait  Alliance,  Greenpeace  and  other  environmentalist  social  movements  (Alper,  2004). 
Second,  free  marketers  promote  a  cross‐border  region  ‘in  an  international  context  of 
competitive  growth’  (ibidem),  e.g.  PACE  and  in  some  aspects  PNWER.  Third,  citistate 
advocates  suggest to “create a sense of  the need to devolve authority  in order to achieve 
other goals such as greater competitiveness, more responsive decision processes, and more 
contextualized decisions”  (ibidem), e.g. PNWER. However, other elements of  this  typology 
could  be  suggested,  such  as  recent  border  security  advocates,  Pacific  North‐West  First 
Nations,  existing  convergent  political  parties  or  global  events  promoters  (e.g.  2010 
Vancouver Winter Olympic Games).  
Nevertheless,  the  existence  of  multiple  definitions  for  a  borderland  is  not  specific  to 




more  specifically  in  the  cross‐border  field,  the  EU  is  confronted  –  and  also  produces  – 
competing  definitions  of  cross‐border  regions.  Two  examples  may  be  emphasized,  the 
Rhineland Valley and the Mediterranean Euroregion. 
In the Rhineland Valley, several definitions of the Upper Rhine co‐exist over time and reflect 
variable and competing  interests within  the area:  the Upper Rhine Conference,  created  in 
1975  by  the  Bonn Agreement10,  is monitored  by  the  French  State,  the German  Länder  of 
Baden‐Württemberg  and  Rheinland‐Pfalz  and  the  Swiss  cantons  of  Basel‐Stadt  and  Basel‐
Landschaft;  other  levels  of  governance  from  the  Rhineland  Valley  are  only  considered  as 
observers.  Moreover,  at  the  initiative  of  the  European  Commission  (EC),  two  INTERREG 
programs  co‐exist  in  the  Upper  Rhine:  in  1988,  financed  by  article  10  of  the  European 
Regional Development  Fund  (ERDF  ‐  promoting  innovative  actions  and  pilot  operations  of 
knowledge diffusion, evaluation and experimentation so as to test new types of community 
funds),  the  EC  proposed  to  implement  a  pilot  program  of  cross‐border  common 
operations11.  Several  European  networks  of  cross‐border  local  and  regional  actors 
responded to this proposal. Among them, in the north of the Upper Rhine, a network called 
PAMINA was officially  created after  the Declaration of Wissembourg,  in  198812. During  this 
two‐year pilot program,  since  PAMINA was one of  the eligible partners of  the Commission, 
pilot  operations  were  developed  on  a  very  wide  range:  information  and  communication, 
cartography,  cultural  heritage,  potentialities  of  forestry  and  breeding,  education  or 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prospective  studies  for  future  cooperation  projects.  Not  surprisingly,  in  1990,  these  pilot 
programs  were  considered  as  successful  by  the  cross‐border  networks,  the  European 
Commission  and  the  member  states.  Then,  on  May  2,  1990,  the  European  Commission 
created  twelve  Community  Initiatives  (art.  11,  Regulation  CEE  no  4253/88)  that  gave  the 
possibility to manage one part of the structural funds to the Commission, in order to carry 
on public  actions  that were  not  included  in  the  existing measures  and  that would  have  a 










sub‐spaces  (Pamina,  Centre  and  TriRhena13).  Finally,  recent  Eurodistricts  draw  a  multiple 
micro‐scaled  approach  of  the  Upper  Rhine  (e.g.  Eurodistrict  Strasbourg‐Ortenau, 
Eurodistrict  Pamina  and  Eurodistrict  Trinational  of  Basel).  From  a  synchronic  perspective, 
internal  divisions  reflect  conflicting  interests  (e.g.  political  and  administrative  oppositions 
between  different  levels  of  governance,  socio‐economic  competitiveness,  etc.).  Several 
politico‐institutional  networks  co‐exist  in  the Upper Rhine,  create  and promote  their  own 
agenda, and seek to share  INTERREG subsidies. Overall, how to explain current cross‐border 
institutional activity which is in contradiction with very tight investments? A shared symbolic 
vision  for  the Rhineland Valley,  and  the  role of  European and  international  strapontin  for 
regional and local leaders may be pertinent factors that reconcile this apparent paradox. 
In  the  ‘Mediterranean  Euroregion’,  formed  in  1991 by  the  governments  of  Catalunya  and 





reshaped  Euro‐Mediterranean  policy  framework.  Additionally,  the  C6  network,  created  in 
1991, gathers six regional capitals (Montpellier and Toulouse in France, Barcelona, Palma de 
Mallorca,  Valencia  and  Zaragoza  in  Spain)  that  are  overlapped  by  the  Pyrenees‐
Mediterranean  Euroregion.  Moreover,  the  Working  Community  of  the  Pyrenees  (WCP), 





lack  of  consistent  strategic  policy  for  the  mountainous  region.  Additionally,  some  major 
issues,  such as  improving economic development or bringing  together public  services,  are 
barely addressed (2004: 321‐322). 
Consequently,  although  the  spatial divisions within  cross‐border  regions are  less apparent 
and  obvious  in  the  EU,  they  can  be  clearly  identified. Moreover,  institutional  differences 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between Nation‐States  tend  to undermine cross‐border  institutional building  in  the Upper 
Rhine and in the Mediterranean Euroregion. Finally, although some initiatives emerge (e.g. 
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC14 or groupement local de coopération 
transfrontalière15),  the  lack  of  sustainable  legal  framework  for  cross‐border  networks  has 
been patently obvious and has represented an obstacle to the deepening of European cross‐
border  networks  (Eckly,  1995; MOT,  2002;  Interact,  2007).  This  is why  Cascadia  is  not  an 
institutional  exception,  but  its  huge  area  and  the  distances  between  the  main  cities 
correspond  to  challenges  that  European  cross‐border  regions  are  most  likely  less  or  not 
confronted to.  
As  it has been  shown with Cascadia,  the Upper Rhine and  the Mediterranean Euroregion, 
defining  a  borderland  can  be  analyzed  as  an  attempt  to  institutionalize  specific  issues  by 
political, economic and social networks. Nevertheless, this perspective does not help us to 
figure  out  how  they  are  concretely  organized.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  how 





Important  differences  exist  between  Europe  and  North  America  concerning  public  and 
private  partnerships  in  cross‐border  regions.  A  priori,  the  EU  cross‐border  areas  are 
dominated by a hegemonic public sector whereas Cascadia is influenced by a strong private 
sector (Hansen, 2002).  
In  Europe,  cross‐border  cooperation  represents  a  unique  public  policy,  assuming  at  least 
one spatial  invention. However, this recent territorial  invention,  initially based on  informal 
relations,  meets  significant  institutionalization  problems  as  we  noticed  in  the  previous 
development.  At  the  EU  level,  this  inventive  policy  is  characterized  by  an  original  multi‐
sector‐based  investment  policy,  materialized  by  the  funding,  creation  /  importation  and 
implementation  of  small  cross‐border  operations,  driven  by  INTERREG  funds  (Leibenath, 
2007). In general, EU public policies follow national precedents; but in this specific case, this 








These  networks  have  been  characterized  by  three  traits  in  a  previous  work  (Dupeyron, 
2005):  first,  as  the  EC  spreads  its  INTERREG  subsidies  too  thinly  in  European  cross‐border 
regions,  one may  observe  a  demand  for  an  immediate  political  profitability;  this  political 
profitability  is  related  to  the  need  of  spending  Community  subsidies,  which  generates  a 
strong  heterogeneity  of  cross‐border  operations,  reinforced  by  flexible  EC  selection 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criteria16.  Second,  cross‐border  networks  are  marginal  since  their  lack  of  homogeneous 
political  coordination  refers  to  a  lack  of  consistency  among  sub‐national  networks:  but 
surprisingly, this  lack of consistency is maintained by these networks that perceive it as an 
asset  in  order  to  preserve  their  own  interests  (Lamassoure,  2005:  13‐14).  Third,  cross‐
border cooperation, also called ‘neighborly diplomacy’ (i.e. diplomatie de bon voisinage), by 






easily  as  pressure  groups  or  think‐tanks.  Thus,  they  are  able  to  make  clear  cross‐border 
demands. Nevertheless, empirical operations or cross‐border outcomes are quite limited. 
Conversely,  Clarke  assumes  that  North  American  cross‐border  cooperation  is  typically 
characterized by its ‘bottom‐up’ (or private) strategies that should be re‐thought, in order to 
adopt  a  more  effective  “top‐down”  approach.  But  although  private  networks  easily 
mobilize, public‐private coalitions can be observed on a very broad spectrum of issues, with 
a consensual key denominator through the concept of ‘sustainable development’ (e.g. 2010 
Vancouver  Olympic  Games).  For  Alan  Artibise  and  Jessie  Hill  (1993),  an  ‘innovative 
governance system’ for the Georgia Basin should be implemented on the basis of economic 
and social sustainability. Nevertheless, although various initiatives have taken into account 
this ecological concern  in Cascadia  (e.g. Georgia Basin  Initiative, Puget Sound  Initiative, BC 
Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, Environment Cooperation Council), none 
of  them  have  generated  a  governance  body  in  order  to  unify  all  existing  ones.  In  this 
perspective, such an institutional failure may support Clarke’s strong bottom‐up perspective 
in  the  Pacific  North‐West,  but  also  show  the  divisions  among  social  movement 
organizations,  organized  into  a  competing  environmental  “social  movement  sector” 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977). 
On  the  contrary,  the  EU would  be  typically  shaped  by  a  ‘top‐down’  perspective  in  cross‐
border matters.  Even  though  it  is  possible  to  accept  in  part  this  postulation  (Koch,  1974; 
Beck, 1997; Keller, 1998; Newrly, 2002),  it  is necessary  to emphasize  the  lack of academic 
attention towards so‐called ‘bottom‐up’ civil society mobilizations in European cross‐border 
regions,  that  can  be  notably  due  to  the  exclusion  of  a  majority  of  private  actors  from 
INTERREG  operations  (Dupeyron,  2003),  as  long  as  they  are  not  co‐opted  by  cross‐border 




the  broader  context  in  which  it  is  inscribed  –  is  the  research  carried  out  by  Philippe 
Hamman,  in  the  Rhineland  Valley,  concerning  cross‐border  workers  (see,  for  instance, 
Hamman,  2005;  2006).  Another  example  is  provided  by  Joachim  Blatter:  although  Blatter 
(2003:  511)  considers  that  the  Badisch‐Elsässissche  Bürgerinitiativen,  a  very  loose  cross‐







56,  76  and  196).  As  a  consequence,  a  vast  research  field  is  open  for  scholars  who,  like 
Romain  Pasquier  and  Julien Weisbein  (2004),  speak  in  favor  of  an  EU  ‘political  sociology’ 
that would shift from an analytical approach based on sectors to another fruitful analytical 
approach based on actors.  
Therefore,  it  seems  difficult  to  formulate  a  strict  classification  of  cross‐border  multilevel 
governance19  that  would  apply  to  a  ‘Type  II’  model.  Thus,  some  of  the  cross‐border 
cooperation  case‐studies we  know may only  fit  partially  into Hooghe  and Marks’  ‘Type  II’ 
approach  (Marks,  1996;  Hooghe  &  Marks,  2001;  2003):  in  the  Upper  Rhine  and  the 
Mediterranean Euroregion, (i) jurisdictions are not necessarily task‐specific; (ii) jurisdictions 













North  America.  As we  have  noticed  earlier, many  academic  perspectives  on  the  EU  have 
adopted a top‐down approach centered on the role of the EC, so that a myriad of regional 
and local actors has remained invisible. Additionally, INTERREG II and III (respectively 1994‐99 
and  2000‐06)  do  not  allow  to  talk  about  a  mere  top‐down  model,  as  regional  and  local 
actors have contributed actively to support and renew INTERREG I (1991‐93): the Committee 
of  Regions  (CoR),  the  Assembly  of  European  Regions  (ARE),  the  Association  of  European 
Border  Regions  (AEBR),  the  Council  of  European  Municipalities  and  Regions  (CEMR)  and 
multiple  INTERREG  steering  committees  have  been  collectively  mobilized  in  this  matter  to 
lobby  the  EC  and member  states. Moreover,  constitutional  frameworks  (federal  in  North 
America, multiple in Europe) in each continent and regional integration processes (existence 
of a supra‐national level in Europe) have profound effects on cross‐border cooperation. For 
instance,  INTERREG funding creates a certain type of  impulsions for many regional and  local 
cross‐border  operations  ‐but  other  less  visible  initiatives  are  present  as  well;  in  North 
America, the lack of equivalent to INTERREG is compensated by other drives issued by various 
governance  levels  (e.g.  financial  or  symbolic  support  by  regional  political  leaders). 
Therefore,  it  is essential to transcend unidirectional perspectives (top‐down or bottom‐up) 
in  order  to  integrate,  in  a  more  comprehensive  perspective  (vertical,  horizontal  and 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Cross‐border region  Entity  Type  I  or  Type  II  characteristics 
(from Table 1) 



















(France‐Spain)  Working  Community  of 
the Pyrenees 
Ia, Ib, Ic, IId  P exclusively 
PACE  IIa, Ib, Ic, IId  p  mostly;  P  (may  have  joint 
activities) 




PNWER  Ia, Ib, Ic, IId  p  mostly;  P  (may  have  joint 
activities) 
 
Finally,  is  there  a  duality  of multilevel  governance models  that  separates  each  continent, 
which might be  congruent with  the  continental  integration processes, namely  the EU and 
NAFTA?  Since  our  focus  is  on  the  concept  of  governance  (and  not  on  the  concept  of 
government which conveys a notion of hierarchy), it is important to remind that private and 




extends  to  the  supra‐national  level  mutually  benefit  from  their  interdependence; 
nevertheless,  recent  INTERREG programs  tend  to  impose a  tougher  selection of private and 
public  actors  at  the  horizontal  level,  which  leads  to  more  political  activism  at  the  cross‐
border level and to a stronger cross‐border Darwinism. At the same time, the responsibility, 
legitimacy  and  social  representation  of  this  cross‐border  collective  action  are  unequally 
distributed  to  all  actors  involved  in  those  horizontal  and  vertical  networks;  specific 
institutional legacies, leaderships and given political cultures shape the distribution of these 
resources. Nevertheless,  the effects of  such  tiny  resources  remain  in general quite  limited 
outside  the  cross‐border  field  and do not modify  radically  the political  economy of  cross‐
border  relations  within  a  given  space,  but  rather  stress  existing  political,  economic  and 





Cascadia  as  a  border  region:  North  American  example  of  a  dual 
European cross‐border paradox? 
In  Europe,  deepening  cross‐border  cooperation  is  confronted  to  structural  obstacles: 
European cross‐border cooperation is constrained by a dual key paradox, often referred to 
as  ‘intrinsic  weakness’  (i.e.  in  which  cross‐border  cooperation  is  conditioned  by  limited 





seems  to  have  similar  issues  that  need  to  be  scrutinized with  identical  lenses  of  analysis. 
Consequently, it is uneasy to suggest that European border regions should be examples for 
North American ones. 
In  the Upper Rhine,  the  “low gravity” metaphor describes  the attraction of  small  projects 
toward  the  sub‐national  levels,  e.g.  Upper  Rhine  history  and  geography  cross‐border 
textbook  that  was  successfully  produced  and  distributed  but  massively  unused  in  the 
Rhineland Valley (ADIRA, 1999). Also, “low gravity” takes us back to major projects that are 
pushed  up  to  the  national  level.  Thus,  the  Rhineland  cross‐border  textbook  (Dupeyron, 
2007), a small project attracted to the regional level, has been followed by a major project, 
propelled  by  a  bi‐national  initiative:  on  May  4,  2006,  German  and  French  Ministers  of 




high‐school  exam – baccalauréat  in  France  and Abitur  in Germany. Originally,  this  project 
had been proposed in 2003 by the French‐German Youth Parliament, during the celebration 
of  the  40th  anniversary  of  the  very  brief  Elysée  Treaty  which  sets  “the  organisation  and 
principles of cooperation between both States”. It had then been implemented politically by 
President  Jacques  Chirac  and  Chancellor  Gerhard  Schröder.  A  group  of  eight  historians, 
supervised  by  Peter  Geiss  and  Guillaume  Le  Quintrec,  wrote  a  history  textbook  for  high‐
school  students  in  their  last  year, Histoire/Geschichte.  L’Europe  et  le  monde  depuis  1945 
(Geiss & Le Quintrec, 2006a). But this bi‐national textbook is not limited to the last year of 
the high‐school  curriculum, as  it  is going  to be extended  to  the  two previous years of  the 
high‐school  curriculum  as  well:  two  books  will  supplement  this  one  in  the  forthcoming 
years: the second one, to be published around 2007‐2008, will be entitled From the Vienna 
Congress to the Second World War, and the third one, to be published around 2008‐2009, 
will  cover  From  Antiquity  to  Napoleon.  Contrary  to  the  cross‐border  textbooks,  the  bi‐
national  textbooks  are  supported  by  the  highest  political  levels,  published  by  significant 
domestic  publishers  and  follow  the  specific  high‐school  curricula  (i.e.  French  seconde  to 
terminale classes, and German 10.  to 12.  / 13. classes) with three consistent volumes that 
can be purchased by teachers and students.  
Other  INTERREG operations  in  the Rhineland Valley,  such as building new bridges along  the 
Rhine  or  the  2004  Landesgartenschau  (Kehl‐am‐Rhein,  Germany  and  Strasbourg,  France) 







political  measures:  before  this  agreement,  cross‐border  bridges  for  traffic  had  to  be 
concluded between nation‐states. While the Pierre Pflimlin bridge, opened in 2002, has two 
traffic lanes, and two pedestrian routes, other bridges built in the 1990s are only meant to 
serve  pedestrians  and  bikers,  in  fact  because  of  this  lack  of  administrative  simplification 
between various government levels.  
The  Landesgartenschau  is  a German  initiative  born  in  Baden‐Württemberg  and Bavaria  in 
1980 and extended since  then  to  the  rest of Germany and Austria.  Its purpose consists  in 
promoting  every  year,  in  a  different  city,  an  urban  quality  of  life  and  an  environmental 
agenda through the development of gardens and flower shows. In 2004, the municipality of 
Kehl‐am‐Rhein  (Germany)  proposed  to  the  city  of  Strasbourg  (France)  to  create  a  cross‐
border  Landesgartenschau,  sponsored  by  INTERREG  subsidies.  In  spite  of many  assets,  this 
initiative  has  been  stained  by  the  inexperience  of  local  leaders  who  found  safety  in  the 
intervention of national political leaders.  
In  the  Mediterranean  Euroregion,  the  existence  of  a  determined  agenda  has  not  led  to 
tangible results, which shows a cross‐border ‘intrinsic weakness’ with specific factors: long‐
standing  domestic  political  party  conflicts,  in  France  between Martin  Malvy  and  Jacques 
Blanc,  and  in  Spain between  Jordi Pujol  and Pasqual Maragall, may be  considered as  key‐
issues.  These  conflicts  have  considerably  undermined,  in  the  Eastern  Pyrenees  in  the  late 
1990s and early 2000s, a  fragile cross‐border cooperation,  its  institutions and  the political 
commitment of sub‐national entities.  
Additionally, the “low gravity” paradox is also persistent on the French‐Spanish border: one 
of  the  three main projects of  the Euroregion23,  the  creation of  the Cerdanya  cross‐border 





French  national  state  and  the  Catalan  public  health  administration,  reveals  that  national 
actors must be present in order to achieve many cross‐border initiatives. 
In Cascadia,  at  least  four examples  illustrate  this  ‘low gravity’  principle:  softwood  lumber, 
fishery,  and  other  issues.  Softwood  lumber  dispute  has  been  a  strong  ‘irritant’  for  BC‐
Washington relations (Smith, 2002: 135), but its resolution has been made at the bi‐national 
level (e.g. NAFTA decisions in 2003 and 2006; in 2006, trade ministers from Canada and the 
United  States  agreed  to  sign  the  final  legal  text  of  the  softwood  lumber  deal)  and  at  the 
multilateral  level  (e.g.  in  2006,  World  Trade  Organization  was  appealed  by  Canada  to 
overturn  an  earlier  decision  by  the U.S.  International  Trade  Commission).  Conversely,  the 







In  short,  both  in  the  European Union  cases  and  in Cascadia,  ‘intrinsic weakness’  and  ‘low 
gravity’ principles show how the Achille’s heels of cross‐border governance tend to fizzle out 
a  certain  amount  of  fragile  projects,  institutions  and  initiatives  and  to  kick  out  to  upper 






border  regions  –  the  Upper  Rhine,  the Mediterranean  Euroregion  and  Cascadia  –  in  two 
distinct  continents. We  have  first  studied  how  definite  spatial  issues  are  represented,  re‐
created  and  institutionalized  at  the  cross‐border  level  in  Europe  and  North‐America.  In 
addition,  after  analyzing  how  private  and  public  groups  shape  cross‐border  governance 
schemes in each borderland, we have defined the characteristics of multi‐level governance 
for  cross‐border  networks.  Finally,  we  have  used  the  same  critical  lenses  –  “low  gravity” 
principle – in order to be able to analyze similar cross‐border issues and avoid a “degreeist” 
perspective. 
Now,  if we synthesize and superimpose Figures 1, 2 and 3 on a  single map  (Figure 4), we 
observe that the hegemonic network area  is pretty much  larger  in Cascadia than the ones 
illustrated  by  the  couple  of  European  case  studies. We  also  notice  that  more  actors  are 
excluded in the European cases, for instance environmental groups.  
Two factors may be highlighted in conclusion. First, this may be caused by the political party 
proximity  that  ties  one  part  of  the  political  party  spectrum  in  Cascadia  and  social 
movements  (liberals  and  democrats),  correlated with  the  regular  political  changeovers  at 
the provincial / state level. In contrast, in Europe, political parties are extremely consensual 
on  cross‐border  matters,  and  tend  to  exclude  the  same  types  of  actors  from  the  cross‐
border field. On Figure 4, a dividing line between conservative and liberal votes emphasizes 








Cascadia.  Conversely,  the  Rhineland  Valley  and  the  Mediterranean  Euroregion  are  not 
mainly defined by environmental values, but rather by economic and symbolic principles. As 
those principles are defended by the regional and local media, excluding social actors from 
hegemonic cross‐border network  is not  really expensive  in political  terms. Nonetheless,  in 













Case‐Studies”, 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 negotiated 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to 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possible” (Pérez 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1993: 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cited 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 2005:  1).  However,  since  I 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 that 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4  However,  having 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 “developmentalist” 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 i.e.  assuming  for  instance  that  some 
borderlands are more advanced than other transnational regions – may 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a 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risk; 




and  local  political  representatives,  representatives  of  various  partners  in  charge  of  Interreg 
operations and individuals from the civil society field involved in cross‐border matters (Europe). I 
also  realized  a  textual  analysis  of  documents  and  press  articles  related  to  cross‐border  issues 
(Europe  and  North  America).  I  eventually  had  access  to  various  political  and  administrative 






9  However,  one  common  drive  refers  to  the  regional  integration  in  North  America  –  through  the 
Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) 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came 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1989 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American 
Free 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 See 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 1975, 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 French 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 Mozart  (Strasser, 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 :  un  modèle 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 coopération 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 Revue 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et  des  pays  de  langue  allemande, 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33, 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 See  the  so  called  “Karlsruhe 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 art.  11‐15:  Accord 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 Karlsruhe  sur  la 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et 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 la 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 le 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 du  Grand‐Duché  de  Luxembourg,  signed  on 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 23,  1996,  http://www.geneve.ch/legislation/rsg/f/s/rsg_A1_11.html,  accessed  on  July 
12, 2007. 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 the 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 “public  policy 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 for 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 Marsh  and  Rhodes,  1995; 
Rhodes and Smith, 2001. 
19 Hooghe and Marks 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 the 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 governance 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(2002: 233), 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intervention 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 For  more  information 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 2007. 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1994: 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